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Summary 
 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a tool for assessing the human contribution to failures, 
usually as part of a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The PSA typically only makes use of 
the quantitative Human Error Probability (HEP) that is produced by the HRA, meaning that 
the detailed qualitative analyses that underpin this calculation and the knowledge that is 
produced in the activity are not utilised outside of the HRA. However, qualitative HRA can 
provide valuable insights into the individual, workplace and organisational factors that drive 
human performance and errors, and may be useful for a range of risk-informed applications 
beyond the PSA. 
A questionnaire was carried to how HRA has been used outside PSA and what potential HRA 
has to widen its scope in the nuclear domain. This questionnaire was distributed to Nordic 
PSA/HRA organisations. In Finland and Sweden, HRA is used in great majority of cases for 
PSA purposes only. The lack of broader experience of the area seems to be one reason for that 
as in the survey, the need for guidance was emphasised. The counterpart for this lack of 
expertise is the lack of respect towards HRA from the part of organisations which are to utilise 
the HRA originating results. These forces strengthen each other: without understanding the 
value of HRA, resources are not distributed to develop HRA and HRA expertise, and without 
proper resources, less HRA can be done. 
A reasonable way to solve this problem would be to strengthen HRA from the inside of the 
HRA community. That can be done in PSA and non-PSA context. Regarding the usage of HRA 
in non-PSA purposes, lot of possibilities can be identified. Part of them are realised but a lot 
can still be done. SAFIR programme provides one possibility to strengthen HRA from various 
perspectives. 
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HEP Human error probability 
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(Assessment method for the performance of safety operation) 
MMI Man-machine-interface 
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PSA Probabilistic safety assessment 
SHARP Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure 
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1 Introduction 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a tool for assessing the human contribution to failures, 
usually as part of a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The PSA typically only makes use of 
the quantitative Human Error Probability (HEP) that is produced by the HRA, meaning that 
the detailed qualitative analyses that underpin this calculation and the knowledge that is 
produced in the activity are not utilised outside of the HRA. However, qualitative HRA can 
provide valuable insights into the individual, workplace and organisational factors that drive 
human performance and errors, and may be useful for a range of risk-informed applications 
beyond the PSA. 
As an example we consider Human Factors Engineering (HFE) which can be seen as a general 
application of human factors knowledge to the design and construction of socio-technical 
systems. In the nuclear sector, the U.S.NRC (2012) Human Factors Engineering Program 
Review Model NUREG-0711 is the main reference document followed in plant modernisation 
and new-built projects. NUREG-0711 recognises the “integral” role of HRA in PSA. The 
standard also clearly states that HRA should form part of the HFE process: “A HRA evaluates 
the potential for, and mechanisms of human error that might affect plant safety. Thus, it is an 
essential feature in assuring the HFE program goal of generating a design to minimise 
personnel errors, support their detection, and ensure recovery capability”. In practice, however, 
HRA is often not linked to the HFE or design process at all, and there is little guidance 
available to support the analyst in performing HRA in a non-PSA context. 
A questionnaire was carried to how HRA has been used outside PSA and what potential HRA 
has to widen its scope in the nuclear domain. This questionnaire was distributed to Nordic 
PSA/HRA organisations. 
2 Scope and objectives 
Scope of the study is restricted in nuclear power plant context, though many applications are 
equally valid for non-reactor nuclear facilities. The main emphasis is on non-PSA related 
applications. It is however somewhat ambiguous to divide applications of HRA into PSA vs. 
non-PSA related ones. 
The purpose of this task is to obtain an increased understanding of the challenges of 
widespread application of HRA in non-PSA contexts at Nordic nuclear power plants and the 
clarification of the needs for HRA in the various application areas. 
3 Overview of human reliability analysis (HRA) 
3.1 Objectives and structure of HRA 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is intended as a set of analyses addressing human failures to 
perform safety-relevant tasks, generally when interacting with a technical system. The typical 
personnel tasks considered are either during normal system operation, or shutdown, or in 
response to abnormal situations. Also maintenance and test tasks are in the scope of HRA.  
The main objectives of HRA are (Hirschberg 2004): 
1. To ensure that the key human interactions are systematically identified, analysed and 
incorporated into the safety analysis in a traceable manner; 
2. To quantify the probabilities of their success and failure 
3. To provide insights that may improve human performance. 
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Depending on the scope of the analysis, the identification of measures to reduce the probability 
of failure, or more generally to improve the performance conditions, may be an explicit goal of 
the analysis.  
The most representative elements of an HRA are:  
 Task analysis and human error identification, to characterize how the task is 
performed and how it may fail (which actions with undesired consequences may be 
carried out).   
 Qualitative analysis of the performance conditions as these may influence possible 
failure 
 Quantification of the failure probability  
These three elements are intended to address the three questions above. Depending on the 
methods used for the analysis, the three elements overlap; also, some iterations are generally 
required. Complete overviews of the whole HRA process can be found in the literature (e.g. 
Kirwan 1994, Spurgin 2010, Forester et al. 2007). 
3.2 HRA in PSA context 
Human reliability analysis (HRA) is an important part of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). 
Adequate analysis of human interactions is one of the elements to understand accident 
sequences and their relative importance to the overall risk. 
The basic method for HRA originates from techniques developed for WASH-1400 (U.S.NRC 
1975) in the 1970’s, which was published in the 1980’s as the HRA handbook (Swain & 
Guttman 1983) including a method called THERP (Technique for human error rate prediction). 
THERP is the best known so called first generation HRA method and is used as a reference 
against which other methods are compared. THERP includes most of the features used also in 
other methods, such as phases of HRA, concepts applied in the structuring of human 
interactions into quantifiable entities (e.g. diagnosis, actions, tasks, and recoveries), assessment 
of performance shaping factors affecting the human error probability, etc. 
THERP is a rather comprehensive and detailed method, and for practical use simpler versions 
such as ASEP (Swain 1996), HEART (Williams 1986), SHARP (EPRI 1992) and SPAR-H 
(Gertman et al. 2005) have been developed. 
While 1st generation HRA methods use a simple error taxonomy and a simple error scenario 
model, several methods — grouped under the name 2nd generation HRA — have been 
developed on the basis of cognitive psychology. These methods apply more complex 
assessment of performance shaping factors and the decision making context to identify the 
conditions for human behaviour. Well known 2nd generation methods are CREAM (Hollnagel 
1998), MERMOS (Le Bot et al. 1999), and ATHEANA (U.S.NRC 2000).  
In today’s PSA projects for NPP, it is common that several methods can be applied for HRA. 
Depending on the type of human interaction different methods are applied. It has become a 
praxis to categorise actions as follows (IAEA 1995): 
 Category A actions that cause equipment or systems to be unavailable when required 
post-fault. Called also per-initiator human errors (when limited to erroneous actions) 
 Category B actions that either by themselves or in combination with equipment failures 
lead directly to initiating events/faults. Called also initiator human errors. 
 Category C actions occurring post-fault. These can either occur in the performance of 
safety actions or can be actions that aggravate the fault sequence. Called also post-
initiator human errors. 
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A typical analysis process can have the following stages: 
 Definition of the scope for HRA and formation of the HRA team 
 Identification and screening 
 Qualitative analysis (task analysis) 
 Definition of human failure event (HFE1) basic events 
 Screening quantification 
 Detailed analysis of important actions 
 Analysis of dependences 
 Documentation. 
In reality, the analysis process is iterative, and is often based on earlier analyses made for the 
same NPP or for a reference NPP.  
There may be also specific adaptions of the HRA methods when analysing low power and 
shutdown, fire, flooding, seismic or other types of external events. 
3.2.1 Qualitative analysis 
For all types of interactions, cat. A, B resp. C, a qualitative analysis precedes the quantitative 
analysis. Purpose of the qualitative analysis is to identify and define relevant human failure 
events, and to qualitatively assess the factors affecting the performance. It should be noted that 
the distinction between qualitative and quantitative analysis steps is not strict, but the analysis 
flow should be fluent. It is however useful to keep the qualitative analysis separate from the 
quantification, since the qualitative analysis should be quite generic and it could be rather 
independent from the quantification model (allowing some choices with the quantitative 
model). 
Qualitative analysis consists of the following steps:  
 Information collection, including collection of instructions, interviews of personnel, 
talk-throughs, walk-throughs, simulator visits, operating experience analysis.  
 Screening process, selection of important actions and related human failure events for 
further analysis. It is important to document which actions have been screened out and 
on what basis. 
 Task analysis where actions are broken down into tasks and performance shaping 
factors are assessed. As a result, a scenario for the human failure event is obtained. 
3.2.2 Quantitative analysis 
The purpose of the quantitative analysis is to provide probabilities for human failure events, 
which are modelled in PSA. The general aim is that the quantification is done transparently and 
consistently. Transparency can be achieved by a well-documented qualitative analysis so that 
one-to-one correspondence between factors and scales is seen. The probability model ensures 
then the consistency. It is however inevitable that subjective judgements must be made.  
                                                          
1 Acronym ”HFE” has two different meanings: a) Human factors engineering, b) Human failure event. In this report, 
“HFE” mainly refers to “Human factors engineering”. 
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The quantification approach can be different for cat. A, B resp. C. It is common to first apply 
some straightforward method, which however may provide some variation with respect to 
performance shaping factors. The methods can be considered to yield screening quantifications, 
which should be sufficient for most of the cases. For dominating cases, the analyst may 
consider to make a more detailed analysis. 
One important factor of the quantitative methods is the way the time available for actions is 
taken into account. Time-dependent models include time as an explicit parameter of the model, 
and such models are applied to post-initiator actions. 
Performance shaping factors (PSFs) represent the effect of contextual factors on the probability 
of human failure. The number and type of PSFs in various methods vary significantly. 
Examples of PSFs are working conditions, stress level, feedback from process, availability and 
quality of procedures, time, training and experience. All generally used HRA methods take into 
account for some PSFs. PSFs are identified in the qualitative analysis phase. 
Figure 1 describes a categorisation of HRA methods depending on the characteristics to address 
task, time or context. HRA methods can also be grouped with respect to the quantification 
method (expert estimation, PSF-based, data based), whether human performance is viewed 
holistically or atomically, number of PSF considered, and so on. On the other hand, it is 
somewhat arbitrary to divide HRA methods into different categories since all methods are 
based on a mixture of theoretical considerations and common sense judgements, and the 
methods provide more or less detailed guidelines to make the assessments. For instance, 
THERP and SPAR-H also include an explicit time-related model. 
 
 
Figure 1. Various HRA models grouped by their characteristics (Spurgin 2010). Acronyms are explained in the beginning 
of the report.  
A number of HRA method reviews and comparisons can be found, e.g., (Forester et al. 2006, 
Bell & Holroyd 2009, Forester et al. 2013, Bladh et al. 2014, Johanson et al. 2015b, OECD 
2015). General requirements, standards and guidance for HRA can be found in (Hirschberg 
2004, ASME 2009, IEEE 2010, IEC 2010, ASME 2015, Johanson et al. 2015a, Taylor 2015a, 
Taylor 2015b). 
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3.3 HRA applications 
There is a broad class of possible HRA applications, and in fact one of the purposes of this 
report is to clarify these. An obvious group of HRA applications follow the applications of 
PSA, i.e., when PSA is used to support decision making, it is inevitable that HRA is involved in 
this process. These “risk-informed” applications include: 
 identification of risk significant human failure events 
 analysis of importance of improvements in procedures, training, MMI 
 analysis of plant modifications 
 selection of scenarios for operating training 
 test, maintenance and outage planning 
 human factors safety review (Vaurio 2009). 
Non-PSA context can be assumed to mean any kind of human factors related activities to be 
considered during various system life cycle phases as listed in Table 1 [IEC 62508]. Examples of 
non-PSA related applications include 
 when designing new procedures, HRA can be used for the identification of areas 
which need the support of a procedure 
 when validating HSIs, the features found vulnerable in human performance should be 
included in validation, in the form of, e.g., simulator run with which the HSI is 
validated, and analysed with special care. 
 
Table 1. Human aspects of the system life cycle stages, reproduced from [IEC 62508]. 
Life cycle phase Activities 
Concept/ Definition Identify user objectives 
Plan HCD* activities 
Understand user needs 
Define HCD requirements 
Design/ Development Use HF knowledge 
Understand maintenance needs 
Test prototypes with users 
Human oriented design assessment 
Realization/ Implementation Skills training 
Health and safety awareness 
Implement fault management procedures 
Operation/ Maintenance Operation/maintenance records 
Corrective/preventive actions 
Incident reporting 
Enhancement Review in service HF performance 
Process improvements 
Recommendations for design changes 
Retirement/ Decommission HF issues related to disposals, recycling and reuse 
* HCD = Human centered design 
 
3.4 HRA knowledge 
This chapter summarizes types of knowledge HRA provides. As such “HRA knowledge” is a 
wide concept which includes 
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 methodological knowledge, which is generic, 
 data type of knowledge which can be originated to specific studies but can be also 
used in generic purposes, and  
 thirdly lessons learnt type of insights.  
In addition, knowledge can be classified from the needs point of view. OECD/NEA (2008) 
addresses the following needs for human performance data in the nuclear industry: 
 data on decision-making in abnormal and accident scenarios, which is central to 
analysing and understanding the risks of scenarios involving errors of commission; 
 data related to the ergonomics of computer display-based human-system interfaces; 
 data on performance in scenarios with extended time frames, which may be associated 
with the slower dynamics of Low Power and Shutdown conditions, of passive systems, 
and of advanced reactors requiring limited actions by the operators in the short term; 
 data on human contributions to latent system failures, associated with maintenance, 
testing, and return-to-service; 
 human performance data to explore the importance of safety culture and 
organisational factors. 
 
3.4.1 HRA concepts 
Knowing HRA concepts can be important information for various purposes. Theoretical 
frameworks of the methods form the basis for the concepts. Theories support systematic 
reasoning, and can be help, e.g., analysing systems and events or specifying requirements for 
designs. As described in previous chapters there are some differences in the theories for which 
reason a distinction is made between 1st and 2nd generation methods and taxonomy of 
different quantification approaches can be seen as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Typically used definitions can be found in HRA guidebooks and PRA standards, such as (Swain 
1996, ASME 2009). Human failure event or human error taxonomies applied in HRA should be 
useful even for non-PSA applications. Example of taxonomies include: 
 Type A, B and C human errors, distinguishing time relationship with respect to the 
initiating event (see ch. 3.2) 
 Slips/lapses (action error), mistakes (thinking error), violations (non-compliance) 
 Error of omission vs. error of commission. Commission errors can be further classified, 
e.g. timing error, wrong object error, wrong procedure error, etc.  
 Skill-based, rule-based, knowledge based types of decision making (Rasmussen 1983) 
 Diagnosis (identification and interpretation), decision making (planning), post-diagnosis 
action (execution), recovery, if previous steps failed — chronology of steps taken in a 
problem solving  
Most HRA methods apply performance shaping factors (PSF) for assessment of factors or 
conditions affecting human error probability. Basically, PSF provides means for qualitative and 
quantitative ranking of human failure events from various aspects. For instance, ASME (2009) 
lists the following performance shaping factors: 
 Quality [type (classroom or simulator) and frequency] of the operator training or 
experience, including training performed just prior to complex evolutions  
 Quality of the written procedures and administrative controls  
 Availability of instrumentation needed to take corrective actions  
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 Degree of clarity of cues/indications  
 Human-machine interface  
 Time available and time required to complete the response  
 Complexity of the required response  
 Environment (e.g., lighting, heat, radiation) under which the operator is working  
 Accessibility of the equipment requiring manipulation  
 Necessity, adequacy, and availability of special tools, parts, clothing, etc.  
Depending on the method, different PSF:s and their scales are used in the assessment. Scales 
can firstly include the question whether certain PSF is present. Secondly, it can be asked 
whether it influences positively or negatively for the performance.  
In a quantitative use, which is essential for PSA applications, PSF:s provides a structure for 
expert judgements supporting consistency and traceability of assessments. A weakness is the 
difficulty to validate the correlation between PSF values and HEP and the difficulty to account 
for the combined effect of PSF:s. 
3.4.2 HRA data 
Operating experience, pertaining to incidents and deviations in NPP operations possibly 
affecting safety are reported in the NPPs. The analysis of the reports show what error has been 
committed and how it has been done. The operating experience reports serve as a tool to learn 
from past experience, ensuring safety, and the same reports provide also important information 
to HRA. 
Simulator studies typically originate from operator training which uses also simulator runs. 
During simulations, it is possible to train incidents and accidents in a controlled way, 
emphasising such aspects in the proceeding of events which require more training. Simulator 
runs can also be organised to learn how operator perform in some specific situations in general. 
The way operators perform during these simulated events reveal also what aspects in the 
operations are the weak points, more prone to operating errors. 
Scenario talk-through/walk-through provides information of what operators have in mind or 
have really done related to the scenario in question. The scenario can be, for example, a 
simulator run which operator just has performed or some other event. During the talk-
through/walk-through the same succession of events is performed but now so that the operator 
talks aloud or shows not only what (s)he has done but also why such a choice to operate has 
been made. This type of methodology provides information of the actual operations and the 
cognitive reasoning behind an erroneous operation or the possible situations where uncertainty 
or faulty reasoning has taken place, even if the actual operation has been correct. 
3.4.3 HRA/PSA-based safety insights 
When HRA is part of PSA, results from PSA provide insights on importance of analysed 
human interactions. This information can be obtained by looking at the risk importance 
measures of human error related basic events. It should be, however, noted that the PSA model 
includes uncertainties and simplifications for which reason interpretation of results may require 
e.g. further sensitivity studies to better assess the risk importance of certain action.  
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3.5 Human Factors Engineering 
Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is the application of human factors knowledge to the design 
and construction of socio-technical systems. The objective is to ensure that systems are 
designed in a way that optimises the human contribution to production and minimises potential 
for design-induced risks to health, personal or process safety or environmental performance. 
HFE plays a major role in supporting plant safety and providing defence in depth (O’Hara et al. 
2012).  
HFE program, as expressed in NUREG 0711 (O’Hara et a. 2012), consists of 12 elements 
which also define the application areas for HFE. The elements can be ordered around the 
general activities (described also in Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Elements of the HFE program’s review model, reproduced from [NUREG 0711 Rev. 3]. 
 
The phases cover the life cycle of the NPP, starting from the definition of important human 
related aspects, taking place before the plant is operational, till the humans perform their tasks 
in the functioning plant. Whenever such changes take place in the plant which affect human 
performance, the corresponding element must be renewed as well. For instance, if even part of 
the HSI is renewed, human factors verification and validation must take place. Thus, the HFE 
as defined in NUREG-0711 does not, so far, include the activities related specially to 
decommissioning. 
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In the NUREG 0711, the specific methods related to each of the activities are not 
recommended nor described. Instead, only some criteria for the methodology are presented, 
related to the element in question. The methods used in HFE can be found in scientific 
literature but in practice, there is a variety to choose from and they are context specific. The 
methods used, as described in journal articles, can be regarded as candidates to be used in the 
context in question, approved by the scientific community, and not as recommendations or 
standards. For instance, O’Connor et al. (2008) used only critical incident technique when 
identifying the team skills required by nuclear power plant operations personnel. In contrast, 
Jou et al. (2009) used (i) task completion time, (ii) reaction time, (iii) heart rate and (iv) the 
questionnaire NASA-TLX (NASA Task Load Index) to measure various types of workload of 
human-system interface automation in the advanced nuclear power plants. Thus, the variety of 
available methods and the specific context and goal related to the research study guide (but not 
dictate) the choice of methodology.  
3.6 Safety culture and organizational factors 
The concept of ‘human error’ is easily regarded to refer to errors people perform as individuals. 
People do their work, however, as members of their work organization. Their tasks originate 
from the fact they work in a certain role, with certain responsibilities and degrees of freedom to 
decide on matters related to their work. The roles are, respectively, related to other roles in the 
form of expected collaboration, coordination or as relationships between superiors and 
subordinates which coexist in large organisation in many levels, structured by organizational 
architecture such as departments and branches. Work organization can be regarded as a system 
with defined interconnections both within and also outside the organization. 
Organizational culture is a concept often used to describe shared corporate values that affect 
and influence members’ attitudes and behaviours (Cooper, 2000). Culture is something less 
openly defined than the evident and documentable organizational structure but it influences on 
how people do their work and how they act in situations not dictated by their specific 
responsibilities related to work role. 
Especially safety-critical organisations should have the ability to monitor its safety, anticipate 
possible deviations, react to expected or unexpected perturbations, and learn from weak signals 
and past incidents (Hollnagel, 2004; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). These abilities are the ones 
describing well-functioning safety culture (Oedewald, Pietikäinen, Reiman, 2009). According to 
a perspective of safety culture developed in VTT, a model of key organisational dimensions of 
safety culture is defined. 
The cornerstones of safe activities are the appropriate mindset, understanding and 
organizational systems and structures (Oedewald, Pietikäinen & Reiman, 2011). Regarding 
mindset, safety should be an important value in the organization, responsibility of the plant 
safety should be taken by everyone and organization should be mindful in its’ practices.  
Regarding understanding, the organisation should understand the hazards related to the 
activities, the connection of one’s work to plant safety and the systemic nature of safety. 
Regarding the systems and structure, the organizational systems and structures should create 
good preconditions to work with good quality. The actual DISC (Design for Integrated Safety 
Culture) model (see Figure 4) describes the dimensions critical for safety culture six main 
criteria, which are (1) safety is a genuine value in an organization, which reflects to decision-
making and daily activities; (2) hazards and core task requirements are understood thoroughly; 
(3) safety is understood as complex and systemic phenomenon; (4) responsibility for the safe 
functioning of the entire system is taken; (5) organization is mindful in its practices; and (6) 
activities are organized in a meaningful way (the matters in the green area of the Figure 4). 
These criteria are enabled by the specific organisational functions such as management actions, 
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change management, learning practices, safety communication etc.  (the matters in the grey area 
in the Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Key dimensions for organizational safety culture, shortened from Oedewald, Pietikäinen & Reiman, 2011. 
 
Individual performance is affected by organizational factors as a whole and, thus, also by the 
safety culture of that organization. Organisations modify, enable and constrain the work 
performance and work related activities of an individual - the same person can assume different 
attitudes and sensitivity to safety related matters, depending on the organisation (s)he works in. 
Safety culture affects safety related performance which means all behavior related to the safety 
culture criteria; such performance includes and exceeds, hence, the activities which relate to the 
tasks defined to the role in question. 
4 Survey 
Seven organisations replied to the survey, from the total of thirteen organisations the survey 
was sent to. Four of the responding organisations were utilities (Forsmark, Ringhals, Fortum 
and TVO), one regulator (STUK) and two consultants (Lloyds Register and ÅF-Consult). 
Below is a summary of the provided replies. All replies pertain to the nuclear domain unless 
otherwise stated. For the precise formulation of the survey questions, see Appendix A. 
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4.1 Experience related questions and the related responses  
The first three questions in the survey presume that the respondent has experience of the 
matter in question. The fourth question in this category is to clarify why this experience has not 
been gained. Below are the questions and the corresponding, shortened and reorganised replies 
(some longer replies may be split into parts and responses are ordered to group similar 
responses together).  
 
1) Has HRA been part of non-PSA activity in your organization, in what way? 
 HRA is primarily used for PSA purposes. 
 HRA assessment has been used to support verification that the reliability goal is met in 
a plant modification. 
 HRA assessments have been used to evaluate effectiveness of post Fukushima actions.   
 Some cases have been studied with HRA in more detail than has been done in the 
PSA. However, these studies could have been part of PSA as well.  
 We have been discussing with our company providing training to operators how 
manual actions as dealt with in PSA could be used in planning training programs. 
 Examples of this are operator training and procedure development. 
 Most HRA work is performed for PSA purposes but we have used HRA insights in a 
new plant for control room design. (As a consultant company, we also have used HRA 
for other industries and human error reduction recommendations were important for 
oil and gas.) 
 HRA has been used as part of analysing operating experience feedback, licensee event 
report and in plant modernization. 
 
To summarise, HRA seems to be used little in other than PSA context. The provided 
non-PSA examples could have often been also PSA-examples but for various reasons HRA 
assessments have not been implemented in PSA. Usually the trend seems to be to use HRA in 
these other contexts only as exceptionally. One reply indicates that HRA could be used also 
systematically in non-PSA context (operator training and procedure development) and one 
respondent reported they have identified that training could benefit from HRA. 
 
2) If HRA was used in a non-PSA context, what were the challenges? 
 No remarkable trouble but as said, HRA is mostly used in PSA context. 
 The way human performance is analysed depend on the application; HRA analyses are 
not as detailed as the ones performed in HFE. 
 In some recent cases there were no trouble. 
 There are limitations in many current HRA methods, such as focus on quantification 
to fit PSA needs or lack of sufficient guidelines. 
 When HRA has been used for analysing operating experience feedback, there has been 
several challenges, the most important ones being the challenge (a) in deciding the 
level of detail and the boundaries for carrying out HRA; (b) in gathering both objective 
data and to gather data sufficiently; (c) in the time-consuming nature of many tasks 
such as gathering the data (interview, questionnaire), assessing the outcome of the data 
gathering, presenting the results in a comprehensive manner, justifying the outcome of 
assessment; and (d) in obtaining recognition and acceptance for using HRA in the 
organisation as people do not see the benefit of HRA and consider it very subjective. 
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To summarise, respondents did not usually find any specific challenges in using HRA 
in a non-PSA context, probably mainly because they did not have very much experience 
about it. In one response it was stated HRA has less detailed analysis methods than the ones 
used in HFE. One respondent highlighted limitations of HRA methods and lack of appropriate 
guidelines. One respondent identified several challenges, party related to the amount of work 
related to HRA and partly related to the negative attitude toward HRA. 
 
3) If HRA was used in a non-PSA context, how successful was it? 
 The usage of HRA was successful in the plant modification example. 
 Use of HRA supported the decision to some changes in instructions. 
 There are always challenges when using HRA in non-PSA context and the results 
depend on the application. However, HRA can bring new insights and viewpoints. For 
example, we have used HRA for identifying risk-important scenarios for operator 
training. 
 We used analyses which were very close to normal PSA and thus, had good routines 
for that. Consequently, we could make decisions based on HRA.  
 HRA provides good input in the form of quantitative results and can highlight human 
actions significant from risk perspective and it is also easy to communicate with plant 
personnel when having HRA findings. 
 With HRA, you can identify the behaviour pattern or acting upon certain perception 
which most likely contributed to a certain failure, based on data from experience 
feedback database. Then it is possible to plan corrective measures and minimise that 
specific risk. With HRA it is possible to enhance the knowledge regarding human error 
and its consequences in order to operate NPP in a safe manner. 
 
To summarise, respondents described the successfulness of using HRA in a non-PSA 
context by telling how HRA provided the needed answers to the questions, enabling 
practical changes; and that HRA provides information related to human actions. 
Contrasting to usual replies, HRA results were here also found easy to communicate to 
personnel (the usual response related to the receiving of HRA results is in this survey that due 
to poor recognition, HRA originating results are not well accepted). 
 
4) In your opinion, why HRA has never been used in a non-PSA context in your company? 
 Due to the challenges, HRA is used less than it would be possible. 
 We don’t have enough people with the HRA competence; furthermore, HRA is still 
not recognised as a crucial parameter showing how human factors affect the operation 
of NPP from reliability and safety perspectives; HRA is time consuming and thus also 
expensive; and finally, lack of knowledge of HRA often leads to the lack of respect of 
the outcome of HRA 
 
To summarise, only two respondents clarified why HRA has never been used in a non-
PSA context in his/her company. One respondent stated the reason to lie in 
(unspecified) challenges. In the other reply, several reasons were identified: lack of 
recognition and knowledge about HRA, expensiveness of HRA and the time-
consuming quality of HRA. 
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4.2 Idea and conception related questions and the related responses 
The following responses do not require any experience on the matter. Instead, respondents 
were asked to present their ideas and conceptions. Below are the questions and the 
corresponding, shortened replies. For the detailed questions, see Appendix A. 
 
5) Where could HRA be used as part of a non-PSA activity? 
 Preparation or updating of instructions/procedures (several responses) 
 Defining scenarios for training with the simulator, training programme development 
(several responses) 
 Analysis of occurred events, analysis of operating experience (several responses) 
 Control room design, for large-scale HMI modernisation, user interface development, 
user interface validation 
 HRA can be used as background information for HF, such as when planning and 
evaluating corrective measures 
 HRA analyses could be used to benefit the following HFE activities: design of tools 
(to learn what solutions are challenging for operators), procedures and training; 
planning and conducting HFE validations (to pay attention to the most critical human 
tasks); and human performance monitoring. 
 Plant organisation modernisation, as part of establishing and maintaining adequate 
safety culture, (and how PSA is involved with maintenance work?) 
 
To summarise, the respondents mainly found the design and development of 
procedures and instructions as well as operator training as suitable applications for 
using HRA in a non-PSA activity. Many responses included also control room design and 
user interface development and validation. As unique replies, the analysis of the reasons for 
occurring events, background information for HF for instance when planning and evaluating 
corrective measures, evaluation of external operating experiences, human performance 
monitoring, plant organisation modernisation and possibly also maintenance work were 
mentioned. 
 
6) What are the challenges in using HRA in non-PSA context? 
 A general challenge is to get contact with relevant context experts who should be 
interviewed for HRA  
 Simulators are owned by KSU [a nuclear power centre for training and simulator 
training in Sweden] which is a different company, meaning that the communication 
channels are not self-evident. 
 Too little experience and guidance. 
 The different view of human performance; the way human performance is analysed 
differs a lot depending on the application and in HRA the analysis is often less detailed 
compared to the one performed according to HFE. 
 We are an operating organisation without a large development department. HF and 
HRA/PRA activities are separate both in our organisation and in the national research 
program. 
 From the HFE perspective, HRA data is difficult to transform into information about 
meaningfulness for design purposes (quantitative HEP:s alone are not meaningful, 
contextual information and condition understanding are important);  
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 HRA is difficult to integrate to HF knowledge concerning non-technical skills 
(operating practise) for achieving appropriate human performance; currently, HRA 
provides a too simple picture of human performance. 
 Budget limitations, lack of HRA method/guideline for non-PSA applications, the 
acceptance of PSA/HRA findings in risk-informed decision making. 
 Time consuming, tight budgets, the lack of agreed-on methodology to assess sparse 
data. 
 
To summarise, several challenges were identified in using HRA in a non-PSA context, 
the main challenges being the lack of expertise to conduct HRA, the nature of HRA 
such as lack of agreed-on methodology or the long duration to conduct HRA, and 
organisational difficulties such as the budget limitations and lack of acceptance of HRA 
findings. 
 
7) What are the HFE needs where HRA can contribute? 
 Similar answers as to question number 5 (training, procedures, user interfaces) 
 Preparation, updating and validation of operating procedures 
 Validation of user interfaces, control room design, I&C design 
 Coupling between HRA and training could be improved 
 Make the management alert regarding HFE and its role in management in an 
organization, i.e., enhance the present knowledge regarding the HFE 
 HRA could benefit from HFE activities, e.g., by providing data and underlying 
information behind the HEPs 
 Data gathering in a systematic way. Preferably, develop a database and share data with 
other similar organizations in order to increase amount of data and reduce cost 
regarding development of such a database. 
 Benchmarking regarding methodology and definitions of failure. 
 
To summarise, respondents gave similar examples as to the question 5 regarding the 
HFE needs where HRA can contribute: Preparation, updating and validation of 
operating procedures; validation of user interfaces, control room design, I&C design; 
planning of operator training. In addition, data gathering, data sharing, method 
development and benchmarking were mentioned. It was also stated that HRA could 
benefit from HFE by providing data and information behind HEPs. 
 
8) How could HRA knowledge (particularly qualitative data) be used in other contexts? 
 Similar answers as to question number 5 (training, procedures, user interfaces) 
 Research could provide ideas 
 Specification of design requirements and comparison of design alternatives 
 HRA knowledge could be used when making design decisions concerning user 
interfaces, procedures, and training. All design decisions should take into account the 
effect of them on human reliability. 
 Regulatory (mandatory) requirement needs to be in place to make use of HRA and 
PSA insights in the plants. Application guidelines are needed. 
 Identification of interesting and important situations and scenarios 
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To summarise, respondents gave similar examples to how HRA knowledge could be 
used in other contexts as when asked to describe where HRA could be used without the 
PSA context (question 5), mentioning training, procedures, and user interfaces. Use of 
HRA to support decision making related to design, procedures and training were also 
highlighted by several respondents. 
 
9) What safety related applications could be used for HRA to provide more data (lack of data 
being the often mentioned weakness of HRA)? 
 If we have data, we do not need HRA. The benefit from HRA is however that it also 
provides some qualitative insight in for the task. 
 Operating experience should be used when possible 
 Data from simulator runs could be used 
 Collection of data from simulator training is difficult for several reasons. The main 
objective is to focus on the operators and to give them feedback and hence the 
instructors have very limited time to record data for HRA. It might still be possible to 
collect data but it must be well organized and preferably done by many plants together. 
 In other areas, when there are few data exist to analyse, it has been developed by joint 
project, commitment, database to overcome this obstacle, weakness regarding lack of 
data, e.g., in the area of fire, pipe rupture. Similar database could be developed to 
reduce the “weakness” of input data to HRA. 
 The framework by KAERI looks good. “A framework to estimate HEPs from the 
full-scope simulators of NPPs: unsafe act definition, identification and quantification.”  
 There are events/situations which occur repeatedly during an operating year, e.g. 
certain maintenance activities. Empirical data should be used in those cases. A 
comparison between HRA assessment and statistical data could be made to judge 
which one better describes the reality. 
 Event investigations provide data 
 Test and validations provide data 
 To get better understanding of the HRA task, plant walk-down, interview and 
simulator observation provide good means. 
 It is not sure how the other related plant activities would help us in the understanding 
of the HRA tasks. Maybe we can get ideas of the safety culture and training level of 
the plant personnel. However, these factors are not yet covered in the study. 
 Lack of data is also a consequence of the lack of an overview of Human Failure 
Events covered in different applications. “EXAM HRA Application guide” provides 
such overview based on its survey. This overview can be used as basis for what data 
that is needed/missing both in terms of HRA applications but also in terms of data 
collection, i.e. in some cases to replace HRA applications with operational data.  
To summarise, data related issues were seen important but also problematic. Joint effort 
to collect and analyse data were suggested. It was also claimed that HRA could use more the 
existing possibilities to gather data. 
 
10) How should HRA be developed (including methods, practices and data)? 
 Evaluations when to use other statistics instead of HRA methods.  
 HRA has many good methods, but data should be used more for HRA purposes 
 To use real data to improve the modelling of dependencies than to improve the 
modelling of individual actions. Often dependencies are of great importance for the 
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results and since the probabilities are higher they might be easier to improve/verify 
with real data. 
 Assessment of low bound values which can be justified for HEP of individual person 
or a group of person 
 NRC method IDHEAS sounds very interesting and it might make it possible to make 
improvements also to other models if one can see that some PSFs are more important 
than others etc. 
 HRA analyses could be more detailed. 
 Lessons learnt from EXAM-HRA project should be utilised 
 In order to better reflect the complexity of human behaviour, HRA should be 
developed into taking into account e.g. non-technical skills. 
 The qualitative analysis of HRA can be improved in the most HRA studies within 
PSA. Application guideline would be helpful. 
 The qualitative part of the HRA analysis should share the Tasks analysis with other 
applications, e.g. when handling and ensuring the MTO aspects are taken into account 
in modernisation projects and new builds. 
To summarise, from the viewpoint of how HRA should be developed, HRA presented 
itself in these responses as something which is not very clear, mainly due to 
methodological issues. The responses described development needs relating both to the 
amount and quality of data and the lack of suitable methods or the guideline to use the 
existing methods. The context in which to use HRA or some other method seems to be 
unclear as well. Some other methods and projects were mentioned as tools which could be used 
to support HRA (IDHEAS, EXAM-HRA and utility applications of NUREG-0700 and -0711). 
 
11) What kind of HRA study would be interesting or important to have in SAFIR programme? 
 As discussed in question 10 (when to use HRA, when other type of statistics; and what 
are the low-bound values which can be justified) 
 How can HRA be used to plan operator training? 
 How can HRA be used in a structured way to improve procedures? 
 Assessment of human performance in the context of complex scenarios related to 
internal and external hazards (confused and conflicting information flow) 
 Use of HRA in design phase as well as operation phase. New builds have many new 
features relevant to HRA. 
 Can the modelling of dependencies be verified/made more realistic by use of real data 
 How the collaboration between HRA and HFE could be improved. How could the 
knowledge / conclusions from the HFE be utilized in HRA. An example is data 
collected in validation of new user interfaces. 
 Methods and assessments of root causes for severe accidents (few international cases) 
as well as for operational disturbances (much more data) 
 How can HRA be used in event investigations 
 Could HRA inspired methods of modelling human behaviour be used for 
understanding better the mechanisms of successful operations? Human performance 
must be approached also from the perspective of successfulness. 
 One study could be to review operational plant experience on dependent failures and 
possibly find defences against such human failure events (HFEs). The work would 
focus on identifying and understanding dependent pre-initiators HFEs, e.g., human 
failure mechanisms and its root causes. Pre-initiator HFEs, or “Category A events”, 
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represent alignment/configuration errors following testing or maintenance, and 
miscalibration are of particular significance. A large number of event candidates have 
been identified within the ICDE data. Based on the HRA good practices, NUREG-
1792, for identification of pre-initiator human actions, the following analysis activities 
for pre-initiator HFEs could be included: 
o Identify activities/actions resulting in dependent pre-initiator HFEs  
o Identify involved PSFs (performance shaping factors) for the specific 
dependent pre-initiator HFEs 
(A study like this has been proposed in the ICDE steering group, no decisions have 
been made in the steering group when to start such activity and no lead country has 
been assigned.) 
 
To summarise, respondents consider the following types of HRA related topics would 
be beneficial to study in SAFIR programme: (1) data (when other type of statistics should 
be used, what are the low-bound values which can be justified, how to use real data to verify or 
make more realistic the modelling of dependencies; (2) methods (when to use HRA, methods 
for assessing root causes for severe accidents, methods for studying operational disturbances, 
how to use HRA in design phase and in operation phase), (3) how to use HRA related to 
specific practical objectives (operator training planning, procedure improvement, assessment 
of human performance in complex scenarios, how to use HRA in event investigations) and (4) 
how to use or develop HRA in broader contexts (how to improve collaboration between 
HRA and HFE, how to use HRA to model successful operations or how to find defences 
against human failure events related to category A).  
The results (I) reflect the need of guidelines to use HRA in present or slightly 
broadened contexts, and (II) show how the usage of HRA could be extended beyond 
the present usual application areas. 
5 Analysis of responses 
5.1 HRA related challenges 
The starting point to the conceptions related to the HRA related questions seems to be 
uncertainty of methodology which could or should be used in HRA. Correspondingly, the fact 
HRA has been used very little in other than PSA context seems to be one of the basic findings 
of the survey. That is the reason for getting so little experiences of challenges or successfulness 
of the usage of HRA in these other contexts.   
Use of HRA for procedure development, for HMI design and for the planning of training are 
familiar HRA applications for the respondents. They are mentioned the most frequently when 
asking about possible applications to use HRA in a non-PSA context. However, only one 
respondent stated that HRA could be used systematically for these applications and, 
furthermore, only one respondent reported they have really used HRA for these purposes (but 
excluding design purposes).  
The uncertainty of good HRA methods is reflected also in the responses related to the 
development needs of HRA. The responses describe development needs related to the amount 
and quality of data as well as the ones related to methodology - even guidelines seem to be 
needed. As balancing factors, some methods and projects were mentioned as tools which could 
be used to support HRA.  
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Respondents contemplated little the reasons for not using HRA in non-PSA context. The two 
replies given to this question appear still convincing; in one, it was stated that the situation is as 
it is “due to challenges”, and in another, several insufficiencies were listed lack of HRA 
(competence, knowledge, respect etc.). It seems to be companies do not invest in HRA to such 
an extent that the usage of HRA would be possible in other contexts. According to the 
responses, the reasons for that range from budget limitations to the lack of agreed-on 
methodology or lack of acceptance of HRA findings. Thus, the reasons may lie in financial 
matters, in the development needs of HRA itself or in the negative attitudes towards HRA in 
the nuclear domain. These factors may be connected to each other in a vicious circle; due to 
negative attitudes, HRA is not financed enough so that its methodology could be developed, 
and when HRA appears methodologically weak, it is not respected nor considered to provide 
important data which results in funding difficulties. 
5.2 Development needs and ideas 
There was a broad area of various proposals for HRA methods development, including better 
use of data, dependency treatment guidance, assessment of complex scenarios, use of low-
bound values, analysis of operating experience data (e.g. ICDE data), success oriented approach 
to HRA, etc. It can be concluded that due to the inherent nature of HRA and its context (socio-
technological risk analysis), HRA will be a topic where continued research is needed. At the 
same time, it would be important to reach some consensus on acceptable methods. 
Lack of data for quantification is seen one of the main problems with HRA. Lack of data leads 
to reliance on subjective (expert) judgements which are difficult to justify and it is a challenge 
for having transparent and traceable assessments as generally required for PSA. Improved data 
collection is seen very important for future success of HRA and its applications. 
6 Conclusions 
In Finland and Sweden, HRA is used in great majority of cases for PSA purposes only. The lack 
of broader experience of the area seems to be one reason for that as in the survey, the need for 
guidance was emphasised. The counterpart for this lack of expertise is the lack of respect 
towards HRA from the part of organisations which are to utilise the HRA originating results. 
These forces strengthen each other: without understanding the value of HRA, resources are not 
distributed to develop HRA and HRA expertise, and without proper resources, less HRA can 
be done. 
A reasonable way to solve this problem would be to strengthen HRA from the inside of the 
HRA community. That can be done in PSA and non-PSA context. Regarding the usage of HRA 
in non-PSA purposes, lot of possibilities can be identified. Part of them are realised but a lot 
can still be done. SAFIR programme provides one possibility to strengthen HRA from various 
perspectives. 
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 Appendix A. Questionnaire  
Your experiences 
1) Has HRA* been part of non-PSA activity** in your organization, in what way? 
* By ”HRA” we mean a set of analyses addressing human failures to perform safety-relevant tasks, generally when 
interacting with a technical system. In particular, we mean type of analyses applied in the context of PSA for nuclear power 
plants. 
** By ”non-PSA activity” we mean all possible activities where HRA would be used beyond PSA. Examples include plant 
modifications, training, development of procedures, operating experience analysis. In many cases, it might be difficult to 
say some activity is a PSA or non-PSA one. You can think that in a non-PSA activity, results from PSA (risk metrics, 
minimal cut sets, etc.) are not discussed.  
Response:  
If you replied “YES” to 1), please answer to 2) and 3). Otherwise continue from 4) on. 
 
2) If HRA was used in a non-PSA context, what were the challenges in using HRA in a non-PSA 
context?  
Response: 
3) If HRA was used in a non-PSA context, how successful was it? Please, give example(s) if possible 
Response: 
 
4) In your opinion, why HRA has never been used in a non-PSA context in your company? 
Response: 
 
  
 Your ideas and conceptions 
5) Where could HRA be used as part of a non-PSA activity? 
Response: 
6) What are the challenges in using HRA in non-PSA context? 
Response: 
7) What are the HFE* needs where HRA can contribute? 
* By “HFE”, we mean application of human factors knowledge to the design and construction of socio-technical systems, 
such as described in NUREG-0711. HFE includes, for example, operator training and procedure design. 
Response: 
8) How could HRA knowledge* (particularly qualitative data) be used in other contexts? 
* By “HRA knowledge”, we mean all kind of assessments made when performing HRA, such as context descriptions, 
performance shaping factors, time windows, probability estimates, dependency assessments, etc. 
Response: 
9) Lack of data is often mentioned as a weakness of HRA. Credibility of HRA could be improved by 
utilising data from other safety related applications*. Do you have any ideas of such opportunities? 
* By “other safety related applications”, we mean any safety related plant activities which are not directly linked with PSA. 
Response: 
10) In which manner (in which direction) HRA should be improved/developed, including methods, 
practices and data? 
Response: 
11) What do you think would be interesting or important to study in SAFIR programme related to HRA? 
Response: 
 
